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I. ThE UNIFoRM Covmx criAL CODE
The most important development in conflict of laws for many
years is the enactment of the conflict of laws provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code.' In adopting these provisions the General As-
sembly did much more than to fix the law for the specific matters
covered, important though these are. The General Assembly rejected
one widely urged method of choice of law, and it prescribed a wholly
different one. It rejected the old vested rights theory which calls for
the use of the law of the place of the last element of a transaction
to govern the case, as, the place of acceptance of an offer to govern
the validity of a contract and the place of injury to govern a tort. The
Code pushes aside these technical connections. In their place it
employs business connections to identify the state whose law is to
be used, that is, the place of a thing, the business headquarters of a
person, the state on which the parties agree, and when other connec-
tions fail of application then "an appropriate relation."
The general section of the Code on the "Territorial Application of
the Act" gives to the parties to a transaction the power to choose the
applicable law:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a
reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties
may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation
shall govern their rights and duties.2
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Charles Evans Hughes Professor Emeritus
of Law, Columbia University; former president, Association of American Law Schools;
co-editor, Cheatham, Goodrich, Griswold & Reese, Cases and Materials on Conflict of
Laws.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-105 (repl. vol. 1964).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1-105 (repl. vol. 1964).
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In the absence of such an agreement by the parties, the section pro-
vides that the Code shall apply "to transactions bearing an appropriate
relation to this state." The conclusion for lawyers is manifest that
instruments within the Code should include an explicit agreement on
which state's law shall apply, but thorough research into the laws
of the related states must precede the choice of law.
Some important special matters listed in the general section are
treated in detail in later sections. These special matters are the rights
of creditors against sold goods, bank deposits and collections, bulk
transfers, investment securities, and secured transactions.
The matter of "secured transaction" is a complex one and several
phases of it dealt with in sections 9-102 and 9-103 of the Code call
for mention. As to a security interest concerning "any personal
property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state," the law of
the state where the collateral is located is the governing law, except
as otherwise provided in section 9-103. The latter section treats of
three situations. First as to "accounts and contract rights," the validity
and perfection of a security interest are governed by the law of the
place "where the assignor of -accounts or contract rights keeps his
records concerning them . . . (including the conflict of laws rules)
of the jurisdiction." Second, with respect to "general intangibles or
. . . goods of a type which are normally used in more than one
jurisdiction" [as "mobile equipment"], the security interest is gov-
erned- by "the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the
jurisdiction where such chief place of business [of the debtor] is
located." Third, "incoming goods already subject to a security in-
terest" are dealt with ,at two stages. The first stage is the inception of
the secuiity interest. If it is asserted that the personal property is
already subject to a security interest when brought into Tennessee,
"the validity of the security interest in this state is to be determined
by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction
where the property was when the security interest attached"; how-
ever if the parties understood that the property would be kept in
this state and it was brought into this state within 30 days for pur-
poses other than transportation through the state, "then the validity
of the security interest in this state is to be determined by the law
of this state." The second stage is the period after the personal
property is brought into this state. A security interest perfected in
another state at its inception "continues perfected in this state for
four months and also thereafter if within the four months period it
is perfected in this state"; with the power to perfect the interest after
the four months period, though "in such case the perfection dates
from the time of perfection in this state."
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The phrase employed in quoted passages of the Code, "the law
(including the conflict of laws rules)," illustrates the use of the
renvoi in some provisions of the Code. The law to be employed is not
merely the local law of the state referred to but its whole law,
including its conflict of laws rule. The purpose of the use of the
renvoi is to assure that the result reached by the Tennessee courts
will be the same as that which would be reached by the courts of
the state to which the Code refers. For example, if the law of the
state to which Tennessee initially refers would by its conflict of laws
rule refer on to another state and use that third state's law, the
Tennessee court, too will make the additional reference and thus
reach the same result that would be reached by the court of the state
identified by the Code.
The discussion of detailed provisions of the Code should not obscure
broader effects already mentioned resulting from the enactment of
the Code. The General Assembly has rejected the old vested rights
theory.3 At the same time the General Assembly has given the force
of law to a broadly based set of principles on choice of law. The
courts of Tennessee may use these enacted principles as guides in
conflict of laws in other areas beyond the limits of the Code itself.4
The results so reached would be in accord with the developments in
conflict of laws in many states and with the basic change made by
Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, of the American Law
Institute.5
II. TORTS-INDEMNrrY
A complex problem of indemnity in tort was presented in Roberson
v. Bitner.6 An employee, Roberson, of a North Carolina employer,
Lance, Inc., was a guest passenger in the employer's automobile
driven by a fellow employee when there was a collision with another
automobile in Tennessee. For the injuries suffered in the collision
Roberson brought an action in tort in a federal court in Tennessee
against the driver of the other automobile and his employers. The
defendants in the tort action impleaded for indemnification both
Lance, Inc., and the driver of its car, charging that the injury to
Roberson was caused by the negligence of Lance's driver. Both em-
ployees of Lance, Inc. were covered by the workmen's compensation
act of North Carolina, and the workmen's compensation act of North
3. On the old Tennessee cases of choice of law as to contracts, see 2 BEA., CON-
FLIcT OF LAWS § 322.49 (1935).
4. See Stone, The Common Law in the United States, in THE FUTURE OF THE,
COMMON LAw 120, 131-32 (1937).
5. See Cheatham, Some Developments in Conflict of Laws, 17 VAND. L. REV. 193
(1963).
6. 221 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
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Carolina barred a claim for indemnity by the third party against
.the employer. The statute of Tennessee, however, did not bar in-
dernity.7 To resolve the conflict between the statutes of the two
states, Judge Neese employed a conflict of laws test for tort in-
demnification similar to that adopted in the Uniform Commercial
Code for commercial matters.
"[C]onsidering the totality of contacts of this event and the parties
with the laws of the two states," he looked for the "most significant
relationship of the several parties" with the two states. Applying
what he evidently believed to be the conflict of laws rule of Tennessee
he found "the most significant relationship" was with Tennessee and
its laws should apply, so the impleader for indemnification was
allowed.
III. JUIMSDICGnON OF CoURTs
A. Activities within the State as the Basis of Jurisdiction
The General Assembly and the courts continue their liberal attitude
toward jurisdiction in non-resident motorists cases. The General
Assembly amended Tennessee Code Annotated, section 20-224 on
"Use of Highways as Appointment of Agent for Service of Process"
by extending it to "any non-resident who, acting in behalf of the
owner of any such [motor] vehicle, uses or causes to be used any such
motor vehicle in this state."8 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit interpreted the same Code section liberally so as to
apply to a non-resident who purchased an automobile in Tennessee
and had an accident in the state on her way to her home elsewhere.'
B. Divorce-Military Personnel
A statute liberalized the rules of competence in divorce proceedings
of military service personnel by creating a presumption of residence of
a person who has lived in the state for a year. It amended Tennessee
Code Annotated section 36-804, "Venue of Action," by providing that
[Amny person in the armed services of the United States of America, or the
spouse of any such person, who has been living in this state for a period of
not less than one (1) year shall be presumed to be a resident of this state,
and the presumption of residence shall be overcome only by clear and con-
vincing evidence of a domicile elsewhere. 10
7. On the conflict of laws rules as to contribution and indemnity, see Wade, Joint
Tortfeasors and the Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. 1Ev. 464, 472-78 (1953).
8. TEN. CODE: ANx. § 20-224 (1955), as amended, TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-224
(Supp. 1963).
9. William v. Kitchin, 316 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1963).




C. Custody-Continuance of Jurisdiction
In Talley v. Talley,." a court in Tennessee had granted to a woman a
divorce and the custody of a child of the marriage. The mother moved
to Ohio to live taking the child with her and there remarried. The
father of the child then filed a petition in the same case in the Ten-
nessee court, seeking among other things a change of the custody of
the child to him. The court of appeals of the western section held, in
an opinion by Judge Bejach, that the jurisdiction of the court which
had originally granted the divorce and custody of the child continued
over the matter of custody even though the mother had become
domiciled in another state.
IV. FuLL FArm AND CBDrr To SisTER STATE JUDGM NTS
Two decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States dealt with
the protection of sister state judgments.
A. Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction
An important recent development in conflict of laws is the in-
creasingly broad protection given to a ruling on jurisdiction by a
court of one state when the question of jurisdiction of the first court
is raised in a second state. The protection given by the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution extends beyond rulings
on jurisdiction over the person to "jurisdiction over the subject
matter," as illustrated in Duke v. Durfee.'2 An action was brought in
a state court of Nebraska to quiet title to bottom land lying along the
Missouri River, which at that point forms the boundary between
Nebraska and Missouri. The Nebraska court had jurisdiction of the
case only if the land was in Nebraska; and whether the land was
in Nebraska turned on whether a shift in the river's course had been
caused by avulsion or accretion. In a contested proceeding the
Nebraska court found the land was in Nebraska, that it had jurisdic-
tion, and that title to the land was in the petitioners. The losing party
then filed in a Missouri court a parallel suit to quiet title to the same
land in him. Becauce of diversity of citizenship the suit was removed
to the federal court. The United State Court of Appeals, reversing
the district court, held that the usual principles of res judicata and full
faith and credit did not apply and the court in Missouri was free to
re-try the question of the Nebraska court's jurisdiction, dependent as
its jurisdiction was on the determination of the state in which the land
lay. The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously reversed
the court of appeals. Finding that under Nebraska law the Nebraska
11. 371 S.W.2d 152 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
12. 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
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judgment was entitled there to res judicata effect, the Court held that
the full faith and credit clause required Missouri to give the same
effect to the Nebraska judgment. Mr. Justice Stewart, pointing out
that the principle of conclusiveness of rulings had been established
as to both jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter, stated there were no overriding considerations that justi-
fied an exception for title to land "as between the parties to the
litigation. . . ." The decision between the private 'parties, however,
could not, he added "bind either Missouri or Nebraska with respect
to any controversy they might have ... as to the location of the
boundary between them." Mr. Justice Black, concurring, reserved
the question whether the Nebraska decision would be binding even
on the parties to the private litigation, "should it later be authorita-
tively decided, either in an original proceeding between the States in
this Court or by a compact between the two States under Article I,
sec. 10, that the disputed tract is in Missouri."
B. Determination of Sister State Law
Aldrich v. Aldrich,13 too, was a case in which a court in a second
state had refused to enforce a sister state's judgment on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. In a divorce proceeding with personal juris-
diction over the spouses a Florida circuit court entered a decree in
favor of the wife for monthly alimony with a provision that if the
divorced husband predeceased the wife, the monthly sum should
become a charge upon his estate. After the husband's death the
divorced wife sought to enforce the Florida decree against his estate
in West Virginia. The Supreme Court of West Virginia denied relief
on the ground the Florida circuit court lacked jurisdiction to make
such a post mortem provision.' 4
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States assumed, as
had the Supreme Court of West Virginia, that the validity of the
Florida decree must be determined under Florida law, of which the
Supreme Court of Florida was the arbiter. To ascertain the validity
of the Florida decree, the Supreme Court of the United States em-
ployed a method which, unfortunately, was not open to the West
Virginia court. It certified to the Supreme Court of Florida questions
on the validity of the Florida decree. Florida "with rare foresight"
has a statute and a rule of court under which the state supreme court
may answer questions of Florida law certified to it by a federal appel-
late court in a case pending before the latter. In an earlier case the
Supreme Court of Florida had entertained a similar question, and,
13. 375 U.S. 249 (1963).
14. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 127 S.E.2d 385 (1962).
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considering the matter sua sponte, held the Florida statute constitu-
tional. 5 It would be well for every state to follow the model of the
Florida statute, extending it even further so that the supreme court
of a state could entertain questions on its law certified to it by state
as well as federal appellate courts. In this way the often troubling
problem of an appellate court determining what the law of a sister
state is on a decisive matter would be eliminated, and the determi-
nation would be made by the court that has final authority in the
matter.
15. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961). After the Florida
Supreme Court answered the question of Florida law certified to it, the Supreme Court
of the United States upheld the application of the Florida law to the case before it.
Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 84 Sup. Ct. 1197 (1964).
